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Abstract: The term wrongful birth denotes a claim 
brought by the parents of an unwanted child who 
was conceived or born due to medical negligence. 
The claims are often dismissed as contradictory to 
good morals or public order. However, there remains 
a neglected question whether the court decision to 
award or dismiss damages could constitute discrimi-
nation against the child concerned. While the child 
is not a party to the litigation, it is nevertheless 
unacceptable for the court not to take into account 
the effects of its decision on the child. In the case 
of award of damages, the court publicly affirms the 
legitimacy of the parents’ need for compensation, 
that is the fact that the child’s birth represents re-
coverable harm to them. The court decision there-
fore means a different treatment in respect to other 
children whose benefits for the family are generally 
recognized and praised by the society. That might 
have serious psychological consequences for the 
child, depriving her or him of the full enjoyment of 
the right to dignity. This fact constitutes discrimi-
nation on the grounds of birth, which can be jus-
tified only by very weighty reasons. Such reasons 
may be arguably given in the case of a child inca-
pable of understanding the meaning of wrongful 
birth litigation, whose special needs are extremely 
burdensome on the family. On the other hand, the 
dismissal of the claim cannot represent a negative 
discrimination against the child.
Keywords: Discrimination. Wrongful birth. Inter-
national human rights law. Human rights of the 
child. Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Resumo: O termo “wrongful birth” (nascimento in-
desejado) denota uma reivindicação trazida pelos pais 
de uma criança que foi concebida ou nascida devido a 
negligência médica. As alegações são muitas vezes re-
jeitadas por serem contrárias à moral ou à ordem pú-
blica. Contudo, continua a ser negligenciada a ques-
tão de saber se a decisão judicial de procedência ou 
indeferimento da indenização poderia constituir uma 
discriminação contra a criança. Embora não seja parte 
no litígio, é, no entanto, questionável que o tribunal 
não tome em consideração os efeitos da sua decisão 
sobre a criança. No caso de procedência do pedido, o 
tribunal afirma a juridicidade da necessidade de inde-
nização aos pais, ou seja, reconhece o fato de que o 
nascimento da criança representa um prejuízo inde-
nizável. A decisão judicial significa, portanto, um tra-
tamento diferente em relação a outras crianças cujos 
benefícios para a família são geralmente reconhecidos 
e elogiados pela sociedade. Isso pode ter sérias con-
sequências psicológicas para a criança, privando-a do 
pleno gozo do direito à dignidade. Este fato constitui 
uma discriminação em razão do nascimento, que só 
pode ser justificada por razões de peso. Tais razões po-
dem ser discutidas no caso de uma criança incapaz de 
compreender o significado do litígio de “nascimento 
indesejado”, cujas necessidades especiais são extrema-
mente onerosas para a família. Por outro lado, o in-
deferimento não pode representar uma discriminação 
negativa contra a criança.
Palavras-chave: Discriminação. Nascimento inde-
sejado. Direito internacional dos direitos humanos. 
Direitos humanos da criança. Convenção sobre os 
Direitos da Criança.
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Introduction
Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,3 the prohibition of 
discrimination has been growing in importance as one of the crucial institutes of international law 
guaranteeing the respect for human rights. A crucial tool to secure the fulfilment of the substantial 
rights of the weak and marginalized. One of the vulnerable groups under international protection 
are children, whose human rights are guaranteed – specially to most of the international conven-
tions – in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states in its Article 2 
(1): “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each 
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his 
or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”
Of many modern issues that could possibly violate children’s human rights, several very 
controversial problems can be found in the realm of medical law and ethics. In this paper we will 
focus on the legal-philosophical aspect of wrongful birth actions. More specifically, the question 
whether the court decision in such cases may constitute a discrimination against the concerned 
child will be examined. We will focus primarily on the European area, and consequently deal with 
the United Nations’ and the Council of Europe’s systems of human rights protection, but since the 
nature of wrongful birth claims is the same across the globe, so should be also the conclusions of 
the paper.
1 Discrimination
The prohibition of discrimination can be found in all the significant international human 
rights documents.4 The Council of Europe embodied the prohibition of discrimination into Article 
14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Europe-
an Convention”). It is important and as well symptomatic that the right not to be discriminated 
under this article was meant to be accessorial, i.e. it can only be applied in the conjunction with 
another, substantial provision of the European Convention5 (Chassagnou, 1999). This reflects the 
3  Most importantly in its Article 2, according to which “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status . . . ” This demonstrative enumeration has later crucially inspired many other 
international documents as well as national constitutions.
4  Apart from the above mentioned Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, discrim-
ination is explicitly addressed for example in Article 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Articles 2 (2), 24 (1), and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and it pervades the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as one of its general principles.
5  Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention, entered into force on 1 April 2005, prohibits discrimination not only in 
relation to the provisions of the European Convention, but to “any right set forth by law.” However, the Protocol No. 12 has 
been ratified only by 19 Council of Europe member states up to this date (Council of Europe).
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more general fact that discrimination always consists of unlawful deprivation of a person of her or 
his substantial right.
Encountering such a prominent institute of international law, we need to question what 
the essential features of discrimination are. Discrimination may be suitably defined as a different 
treatment of certain individuals or groups in relation to others where no reasonable distinction can be found 
between those treated differently.6
In a particular case, two questions emerge from this definition. First is as to whether the 
treatment is or is not different. While such a question might seem trivial in some cases, in others it may 
be the most difficult to answer. In order to understand this more thoroughly, we need to distin-
guish direct and indirect form of discrimination (Kühn, 2007). In case of direct discrimination, the 
legislation, policy or conduct is discriminatory in itself. Indirect discrimination, however, consists of 
specific discriminatory effects of otherwise neutral cause. Examples of this can be very varied from a 
building accessible only by a flight of stairs indirectly discriminating the wheelchair users (Hunter, 
1992, p. 130) to intelligence tests that are not culturally understandable to their subjects.7
In both above mentioned situations, discrimination actually consists of not differentiating 
between certain groups of people and their needs. This may be true also in case of indirectly discrim-
inating legal norm which is applied to all its addressees equally while the norm has too broad a scope 
and thus has unequal effect on the addressees – just because it is applied, in formal terms, equally 
(Kühn, 2007). That is sometimes referred to as the first subtype of indirect discrimination. The second 
subtype consists of an exemption from a general rule or practice that has disproportionate effects on a 
certain group: for example less legal protection for part time employees may be in fact discriminating 
against women under condition that they form a majority of these employees (Kühn, 2007).
While the second subtype calls for the same treatment, the first subtype of discrimina-
tion must be eliminated by establishing an exception. If there is an adequate reason for a different 
treatment of a certain group, such a different approach should be adopted (Rivers, 2002, p. xlix). 
The concerned group might have a right to this differentiated treatment, i.e. the right to positive 
discrimination, but only under the circumstances that not only permit but require the distinction 
(Alexy, 2002, p. 274).
Now we are confronted with the obvious fact that not all differences in treatment are 
equal: some may be permissible, some damnable and some necessary. That is the second question 
arising from the definition of discrimination: is the distinction which constitutes a ground for the different 
treatment reasonable? European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) accurately defined criteria that 
has to be met in order to justify the different treatment. It has to have an “objective and reasonable 
6  As an example of a dictionary definition of discrimination, the Black’s Law Dictionary might be used, according to which 
discrimination consists in “[a] failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those 
favored and those not favored” (Black, 1990, p. 467).
7  Although there are probably no intelligence tests free of favouring certain culture’s cognitive style (Benson, 2003, p. 56).
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justification,” in other words it must “pursue a legitimate aim” and, cumulatively, there must be “a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised” 
(Chassagnou, 1999, p. 91). Otherwise, the discrimination is constituted.
For the needs of practice, the international documents as well as jurisprudence form “sus-
pect” grounds of discrimination. These grounds are typically to be found in non-exhaustive lists of 
anti-discrimination norms. When assessing a different treatment based on a “suspect” ground, the 
court would use much stricter criteria for justification of such treatment (Kühn, 2007).
We can therefore conclude with a more nuanced definition of discrimination: a person is 
discriminated against either when 1) he or she is deprived of his or her right because 2) he or she 
is treated differently in respect to other persons 3) on the ground that does not provide an objec-
tive and reasonable justification, or, alternatively, when 1) he or she is deprived of his or her right 
because 2) he or she is treated in the same manner as other persons 3) when there is a compelling, 
objective and reasonable justification for different treatment.
3 Wrongful birth
In general, wrongful birth is a term denoting a medical malpractice claim brought by the 
parents of an unwanted child who was conceived or born due to medical negligence (Black, 1990, 
p. 1612). These actions must be distinguished from wrongful life claims that are brought on behalf 
of a child brought with birth defects (Black, 1990, p. 1613) and which are not subject of this paper.
Wrongful birth cases are usually divided into two types (A. Doležal, 2013, p. 42). Wrong-
ful birth claims in the narrower sense are brought by the parents of an impaired child, alleging that 
negligent treatment or advice deprived them of the opportunity to avoid conception or terminate 
the pregnancy (Black, 1990, p. 1612). A medical negligence might have occurred in respect to perfor-
mance of abortion or prenatal diagnosis, or the doctors might have failed to inform the parents about 
the embryo’s or foetus’s diagnosed condition or the related risks (A. Doležal, 2013, p. 42). The term 
wrongful pregnancy (or conception), on the other hand, is used in the situations when the parents of 
a healthy child (A. Doležal, 2013, p. 42) sue the medical service (health care) provider for a negligent 
performance of a sterilization procedure or abortion (Black, 1990, p. 1612), or a failure to provide ac-
curate information about the success or reliability of these procedures (Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 93).
In both cases, the child would have never been born had it not been for the breach of 
contract between the now-parents and the medical service provider. The harm consists of a viola-
tion of the parent’s rights to self-determination and privacy and also in the effects on their finan-
cial situation (Šustek, 2011, p. 348). The parents can therefore claim damages for immaterial (i.e. 
intangible) harm (the loss of control over one’s own life,8 pain and inconvenience associated with 
8  From a legal-philosophical perspective, this apparently constitutes a compelling case for granting wrongful birth claims, 
given that a modern medical law (as well as all areas of law) stem significantly from a philosophy of autonomy, ultimately 
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pregnancy and giving birth (Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 94), mental suffering (Šustek, 2011, p. 349), 
etc.), material losses (typically maintenance costs, but also loss of profit (Goold, & Herring, 2014, 
p. 94)) or both.
From the strictly positivist perspective, the wrongful birth cases are just another medical 
negligence litigations.9 Medical service providers have their civil liability; if their contractual duty is 
breached, harm is suffered and a causal nexus is established, the plaintiff ’s claim should be granted 
(Šustek, 2011, p. 350-351), perhaps with the caveat that the harm, in order to be compensable, must 
have been foreseeable for the health care provider at the time of wrongful act or omission (Holča-
pek, 2016, p. 310). After all, without civil liability the incentives to provide proper health care would 
be weakened and the effectiveness of rules regulating medical services nearly nullified (Holčapek, 
2013, p. 250). Wrongful birth claims are sometimes subjected to purely legal criticism (primarily 
in cases of disabled children when the defendant alleges the lack of causal link: medical negligence 
caused the birth of the child but not its impaired health condition which has a completely inde-
pendent cause (Smetánková, 2014, p. 165-166)), but dismissal of the claim on these grounds is not 
frequent (Smetánková, 2014, p. 178).
The ethical side of the problem is different. Not surprisingly, the wrongful birth concept 
faces a fierce criticism. Many find it outrageous that a child could be considered a harm to compen-
sate, stressing that every child is a blessing, while others claim that the distinction between a child 
and above mentioned harms must be made (Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 98). Others are concerned that 
physicians under pressure of possible wrongful birth claims would encourage women to terminate 
pregnancies when the mother would not be sure or when there would be the slightest suspicion of ail-
ment (Vácha, 2008, p. 112). And there are strong voices warning that the child could be later harmed 
by learning that their parents claimed for a compensation for them (Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 101).
If these and other concerns are to be brought to the courtrooms, the institutes designed to 
mitigate the harshness of positive law and connect it with the realm of morality must be used. There 
are three options: good morals,10 public order and discrimination. The argumentation against granting 
the wrongful birth claims usually focuses on its impact on society and even when it highlights possible 
harm caused to the child, it uses the first two options.11 In the next part of the paper, the approaches 
of jurisprudence of selected European countries will be briefly presented. Then, in the last part of the 
paper, we will discuss a (hitherto neglected) research question whether the court decision granting or 
dismissing the wrongful birth claim can have a discriminatory effects on the child concerned.
referring to Kantian conception of autonomy as an intrinsic and defining feature of a human being (Cf. Berg, Appelbaum, 
Lidz, & Parker, 2001, p. 22).
9  Obviously, wrongful birth claims, at least when connected with negligent performance of abortion, make any sense only 
in countries where abortion is legal.
10  Generally based on the assumption that human life is the fundamental interest that should be protected by the law at the 
very first place, even before ensuring the principle pacta sunt servanda.
11  Cf. McFarlane (1999, p. 114, per Lord Millett), Udale (1983), T. Doležal (2013), Vácha (2008, pp. 111-112).
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4 Jurisprudence in selected European countries
 In Germany, wrongful birth claims are classified as damages resulting from a breach of 
duty not different from other civil litigations. Courts usually grant the claims for compensation of 
immaterial and material harm including loss of profit and maintenance costs (T. Doležal, 2013, p. 7). 
An example of this approach might be the decision 13 U 134/04, 1 February 2006.
The situation in Austria is more differentiated. Only some claims are classified as damage 
resulting from a breach of duty (typically claims for qualified material damage but not immaterial 
damage since according to Austrian courts, pregnancy is not considered a bodily harm (T. Doležal, 
2013, p. 7)). The Austrian approach has its roots in the decision 1 Ob 91/99k, 25 May 1999. The Su-
preme Court concluded in what is known as Bydlinski’s argument that when the questions of digni-
ty of a human being are concerned, the right to compensation principles can be applied only in cases 
when the maintenance costs of the child represent exceptional burden on the parents (Cf. Koziol, 
2012, pp. 125-130). This principle has then been repeatedly used by the Supreme Court, for exam-
ple in the cases 6 Ob 303/02f, 23 October 2003, or 6 Ob 101/06f, 14 September 2006. The Supreme 
Court also repeats its clarification that the birth of a healthy unwanted child cannot constitute ba-
sis of a claim for compensation because of the child’s personal value, and that exceptional awarding 
of damages does not mean a negative assessment of the disabled child but exclusively an attempt 
of monetary compensation of special maintenance costs (Šustek, 2011, p. 351-352). This approach 
was confirmed by the decision 9 Ob 37/14b, 29 January 2015. In this case the problem was that 
after a sterilization, the woman gave birth to a healthy child. The birth of the child constituted a 
financial burden for the family. The Supreme Court repeated that the birth of a healthy child is not 
a damage. A compensation for damages may only be awarded in case of birth of a disabled child or in 
case that the birth of a healthy child would constitute a financial burden for the family represented 
by the maintenance costs. Such a financial burden shall only be compensated in a situation threat-
ening plaintiff ’s personal situation and the security of livelihood.
The crucial ruling for the contemporary situation in the United Kingdom is McFarlane 
and Another v Tayside Health Board (1999). The House of Lords decided that damages were not 
recoverable by the parents of a healthy child born as a result of a negligent sterilisation. The plaintiff 
Mrs McFarlane was awarded compensation for her pain and suffering in pregnancy and immediate-
ly consequential financial losses; however, the compensation of the costs of raising an unwanted 
healthy child would no longer be allowed, being considered an irrecoverable economic loss. After 
McFarlane, later cases have held that the additional cost of raising an unwanted disabled child over 
and above the normal costs of having a child will be compensated.12 
12  E.g. Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust (2001).
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5 The analysis of wrongful birth claims in respect to discrimination
First it needs to be clarified that even though in wrongful birth cases the child is not party 
to the litigation, it is nevertheless unacceptable for the court not to take into account the effects 
of its decision on the child. According to the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence, the law can be 
understood as a social force that brings about either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences 
for individuals, while, of course, the therapeutic effects should be maximized and vice versa (Hen-
sel, 2005, p. 163). This demand can hardly be rejected. It may seemingly fit rather in the concept 
of distributive justice which aims for a just distribution of costs and benefits in society (Goold, & 
Herring, 2014, p. 103) than corrective justice that through liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by 
one person on another (Weinrib, 2002, p. 349). However, even within the realm of corrective justice 
the court “. . . must decide whether recognition of a cause of action would do more harm than good” 
(Kelley, 1979, p. 928).13 In addition, damages are not awarded out of nowhere: there must be paid by 
someone, who will then often, in effect, spread such loss among the society as a whole (e.g. by com-
pulsory insurance of health care providers). It is highly beneficial for such system not only to allow 
claims which are worthy of it, but also to reject those which are not (Holčapek, 2011, pp. 24-25). 
It is imaginable that both basic options of a court decision in wrongful birth cases, i.e. 
granting the claim or dismissal of it, could constitute discrimination against the child. If any of the-
se cases indeed constituted discrimination, it would be discrimination on grounds of birth which is 
explicitly prohibited by the majority of international human rights documents including Article 2 
(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child14 and Article 14 of the European Convention.15,16 
Typically, the discrimination on the grounds of birth in practice refers to one’s status as born out of 
wedlock (Maldonado, 2011), but could also refer to the status of being adopted (Handbook, 2011, p. 
116) or any other resulting from the circumstances of one’s birth. According to the ECHR case-law,17 
13  The principle of taking the child’s interests into account is reinforced by the provision of Article 3 (1) of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child which states: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration,”
14  Article 2 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states: “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set 
forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the 
child’s or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic 
or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”
15  Article 14 of the European Convention states: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
16  From other international law provisions explicitly prohibiting discrimination on grounds of birth we shall name Article 2 
of the Declaration on Human Rights, Article 2 (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights or 
Articles 2 (2), 24 (1) and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
17  ECHR decided for example in the following cases of alleged discrimination on the grounds of birth: Mazurek v France (No. 
34406/97), 1 February 2000, Sommerfeld v Germany (No. 31871/96), 8 July 2003, Sahin v Germany (No. 30943/96), 8 July 
2003, Camp and Bourimi v The Netherlands (No. 28369/95), 3 October 2000.
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discrimination on the grounds of birth is submitted to the “very weighty reasons” test (Cf. Sommer-
feld, 2003), given that children have no control over the circumstances of their birth.18
In case of wrongful birth claims where children with disabilities are concerned, the pos-
sible discrimination would also be constituted on the grounds of disability as explicitly prohibited 
in Article 2 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.
Now we will proceed to examination of possible court decisions with respect to their 
potential discriminative effects. First we will discuss the situation when the court awards dama-
ges, then we will focus on the opposite alternative. We will not consider the possibility of a partial 
award of damages, since in that case the arguments for and against awarding damages and dismis-
sing the claim can be simply applied together reciprocally.
a) Negative discrimination caused by award of damages
There are serious concerns that the child can be harmed by learning that his or her parents 
wanted to be compensated for her or his existence (Cf. Goold, & Herrin, 2014, p. 101), and if the 
court affirms the legitimacy of such claim by awarding damages, the child can arguably perceive it 
as a kind of denial from the society as well. Even though the relevancy of these worries is not scien-
tifically confirmed (which is not at all surprising given the relatively low number of cases and their 
distribution in many countries), they cannot be easily ignored.
If these concerns are justified, as we will discuss below, the child’s right to dignity would 
be at stake. Dignity, supposedly alongside with life and self-determination, may well be considered 
one of leading principles of contemporary human rights law.19 The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child states in its preamble that it is based among other values on the “recognition of the inherent 
dignity” and “worth of the human person.” Article 2 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
clearly prohibits all kinds of discrimination, explicitly naming discrimination on the grounds of 
birth.20 With regards to disabled children, the Convention on the Rights of the Child specifically 
stresses their right to “. . . a full and decent life, in conditions which ensure dignity. . .”
Dignity is, however, a significantly vague term. There are many different understandings 
of it, but in the basics of them all, there is overlapping consensus that dignity is connected with the 
intrinsic worth every human being has merely by being human (McCruden, 2008, p. 679). It is not 
18  In the case of a person born out of wedlock, Mazurek v France, ECHR decided that while preserving the traditional family 
is a legitimate aim, it cannot be proportionally achieved by penalising the child who has no control over the circumstances 
of their birth (Mazurek, 2000).
19  Here we can emphasise the crucial role of dignity for example in the Declaration of Human Rights or the European Con-
vention.
20  Article 2 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in 
the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s 
or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.”
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clear how exactly this intrinsic value can be defined; however, Kantian concept of dignity as a value 
that cannot be expressed in money terms (Cf. Barroso, 2012, p. 362) can be useful. For practical 
reasons, human life can be given certain “price” in well-defined context, for example rationalization 
of health care or damages in wrongful death cases.21 However, this never represents the full value 
of life. In both above mentioned examples, we can sense that the amount of money is always too 
low: if the situation was better, there would be more resources to be spent on a patient and those 
who lost a loved one would be awarded something better than money. Putting price on life seems 
like a desperate effort to get as close to the incomparable value of human life as it is possible under 
current circumstances, by the most practical and yet absolutely insufficient mean, that is money.
In case of wrongful birth claims, however, this logic turns out to go against the very basis 
of the traditional understanding of the value of children and human life itself: it may seem that the 
parents wish to be compensated as much as possible for something that excludes the possibility of 
full compensation, i.e. the change of their lives caused by the child.
A very important argument in favour of awarding wrongful birth claims denounces this 
line of thought and insists that it is crucial to distinguish between the benefits and costs of raising 
the child. The parents by no means sue for the existence of the child, but for all the distress and 
financial costs of pregnancy, birth and parenthood (Cf. Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 101). If this argu-
ment is justifiable, the dignity of the child would not necessarily be violated.
We are now facing the question whether this argument has logical consistency. A person 
can, indeed, have ambivalent relation to a certain situation, thing or person. However, it is nor-
mally presumed that determining whether something is rather beneficial or harming is, at least in 
clearly defined context and at least theoretically, possible. The law of torts is based on common 
experience that certain situations are generally harming for people in certain position. The injury 
usually brings more harm than good to the injured, otherwise it would not be considered “injury” 
in ordinary parlance. It might well be possible that thanks to the injury, the person would find a 
husband in the hospital or otherwise will be largely benefited by the event; however, this is rather 
an exception to the general rule, and, even more importantly, it is a result of a too complex series of 
consequences to have legal relevancy. The value of human life is embodied into law, among others, 
by the presumption that life is better than death. Arguably, this can be in certain cases otherwise, 
but since the two options are mutually exclusive, they cannot be at the same time equally benefi-
cial. If someone would publicly state that death of his family member meant a great good to him, 
we would not only consider it tasteless, but also logically incoherent with the claim for damages for 
psychological suffering.
21  Damages in wrongful death cases are, however, intended to reimburse the emotional distress of the family and friends, 
not the loss of life of the deceased.
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This line of reasoning is connected with the question of the main function of tort law. We 
were now discussing mainly the reparation of inflicted harm. If we choose a preventive function 
to be primary, award of damages would make sense, since it can deter medical professionals from 
conducting their duties negligently (however, we still need to take into account their possible incli-
nation to encourage abortions rather than risking wrongful birth actions). 
It seems, then, that parents can very hardly claim both happiness for having the child and 
damages for what is inevitably connected with raising the child. It can be argued that parents once 
showed the willingness to raise the child, implying the child is rather beneficial than harming to 
them (even if it was for the sense of fulfilment of a certain perceived duty), because they could have 
put up the child for adoption. The law, of course, does not expect the parents to do it, and for that 
reason it would be very questionable to consider not doing so an interruption of the causal nexus 
between the medical negligence and the harm.22 From a logical perspective, however, the claim 
for recovering the maintenance costs after choosing to raise the child is contradictio in adjecto. The 
plaintiff either claims for a compensation for something she or he does not really perceive as a harm 
(thus seeks rather the source of income than compensation), or publicly proclaims that the child 
represents harm.23 In other words, the claim for compensation is either groundless, or awarding the 
claim would be capable of harming the child’s dignity.24
This line of reasoning is connected with the question of the main function of tort law. 
It appears that restitutio ad integrum, restoration to original condition, is a basic tort law principle 
in all European jurisdictions (Smits, 2012, p. 228). In Czech law, restitution to original condition is 
considered the primary way of compensating damages.25 This approach is obviously based on the 
assumption that pecuniary compensation is the best available remedy, but the ideal remedy would 
consist of elimination of the wrong. In wrongful birth cases, of course, restitution to original condi-
22  Similar argumentation by Goold and Herring in respect to not aborting the baby after failed sterilisation: “It is clear from 
the case law that a woman is not expected to have an abortion, and a failure to do so cannot constitute an intervening act 
that would become the cause of the harm” (Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 95-96).
23  In this argumentation, we presume that the “benefits-harms ratio”  of raising the child can be determined not only the-
oretically, but also practically (however only approximately). A different approach was chosen by Lord David Hope in his 
interesting argument against awarding damages in McFarlane and Another v. Tayside Health Board. According to Lord Hope, 
burdens of raising a child can be estimated, but benefits of a child are incalculable, and therefore incommensurate with the 
costs. For that reason, it is better to assume that benefits and burdens are in equilibrium and no award is needed. “(It is not) 
fair, just and reasonable to leave these benefits out, and to do so would mean that the parents were over-paid” (McFarlane, 
1999, p. 97, per Lord Hope).
24  Lon L. Fuller in his famous work The Morality of Law distinguishes between logical incoherency and what we may call 
teleological incoherency of legal norms. Logically inconsistent norms are not in accordance with the law of noncontradic-
tion, in other words they state both A and non-A. However, some norms are logically coherent but they do not reflect any 
reasonable legislative purpose (for example they make some behaviour compulsory and prohibited at the same time, which 
is logically possible but probably very unreasonable). In this context, we may consider the claim for damages in wrongful 
birth case logically incoherent if the child is beneficial to the parents. Award of damages would be in any case teleologically 
incoherent, because the law and jurisprudence should seek the best interest of the child. (Cf. Fuller, 1998, pp. 65-67).
25  Section 2951 (1) of Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code: “Damage is compensated by the restoration to the original state. If 
this is not reasonably possible, or if so requested by the victim, damage is payable in money.”
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tion is not possible, since it would mean the nonexistence of the child.26 This illustrates quite well 
the relation between harm and compensation in wrongful birth claims.
Discrimination resulting in the denial of dignity is particularly serious when the victim 
realizes and suffers from the situation. The discrimination constituted by the court decision in 
wrongful birth cases would then primarily consist of harming the child’s sense of self-worth. 
The fact that the parents of the child felt they need to be compensated for alleged harms 
resulting from the child’s birth – and the state authority represented by the court – may leave certain 
mark of “exclusion” on the child, or, in other words, stigmatize her or him. It is well known that stig-
matization may have a profound impact on a person’s well-being; as the labelling theory shows, ne-
gative labels are capable of profoundly distorting one’s self-concept and influencing one’s way of life.27
In context of wrongful birth cases, we may think of several ways the child can be harmed 
by the stigma of “unwantedness”. Wrongful birth cases are usually very attractive to the media, and 
if the child’s identity would be disclosed, the memory of it can be evoked by the people who create 
the social environment of the child several years later. Given the social stigma related to adoption 
(Cf. Wegar, 2000, p. 363), it can be presumed that situation would be similar or worse in the case 
of unwanted child. The people forming the social environment of the child (such as teachers and 
classmates, coaches and children in sport clubs, “next-door friends” or, when the child grows up, 
even the colleagues) can be expected to react with the mixture of aversion and unwelcomed expres-
sions of sympathy. These reactions would be probably the strongest when the child is in the most 
vulnerable age, being very sensitive to his or her social position. The stigmatization is likely to be 
the more serious the more the child is disabled.28 While it may be argued that this problem concer-
ns discrimination caused not by the wrongful birth litigation but by social intolerance, the court 
should be aware of the possibility of such consequences of its decision.
However, even if the information of the awarded damages never reaches anyone’s but the 
child’s ears, a very serious harm can be done. It may disrupt the family relationships, and even if 
there is no conflict on the surface, the child may be in serious doubt about her or his meaning to the 
family. Of course, the fact that the parents sued for wrongful birth does not necessarily imply that 
they do not love the child. Furthermore, there are relatively many unwanted pregnancies and many 
of these children are truly loved once they are accepted.29 However, after wrongful birth litigations 
it may be very difficult for the parents to explain to the child the paradox of simultaneous loving 
and claiming damages. 
26  As Dimopoulos and Bagaric (2003) put it, “. . . the primary aim of damages is to restore the plaintiff in the position he or 
she would have been in but for the tort. In the context of wrongful life actions, the original position is death” (p. 61).
27  We can recall the research on the role labelling in education (Cf. Ercole, 2009) or criminal behaviour (Cf. Bernburg, Krohn, 
& Rivera, 2006).
28  As Hensel (2005) points out, “[w]hen a mother disavows the worthiness of her child’s life in open court, those who lack 
a first-hand knowledge of the child will naturally trust the mother’s judgment” (p. 173).
29  Similar line of argument in McFarlane (1999, p. 75, per Lord Slynn).
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An experience of clear identity, security and unconditional love in family during the chil-
dhood is very important for establishing a healthy self-esteem, which is so vital to dealing with all 
kinds of challenges in life. Not only practical legal reasons, but also – and maybe foremost – these psy-
chological needs of a child stand behind the right to identity in Articles 730 and 831 of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. And for these reasons, for decades there has been a serious psychological 
research as to at what age and how to disclose to the children the fact they were adopted. Even though 
adopted children generally do not have a reason to doubt their adoptive parent’s willingness to raise 
them (quite the opposite, as the parents must have undertaken a relatively long procedure to adopt 
them), they are, compared to other children, at higher risk across several domains including achieve-
ment in school or even mental health difficulties (Bramlett, Radel, & Blumberg, 2007, pp. 554-560). 
Although many of these problems can be partly attributable to genetic causes, psychological issues 
cannot be overlooked. Adopted children are disproportionately likely to suffer from identity problems 
which leads to shame, embarrassment low self-esteem (Barran, & Pannor, 1993, p. 120) or feelings of 
guilt (Patricelli, 2015). It is likely that all these issues may afflict a child after successful wrongful birth 
action, feeling deep shame and guilt as an officially confirmed burden on her or his own family.
In order to build a healthy self-esteem (which is so vital to dealing with all kinds of chal-
lenges in life), a child needs to develop a favourable self-concept and clear identity. If her or his self-
-concept and identity are polluted with insecurity, guilt and shame, the child would probably have 
serious difficulties with experiencing true intrinsic worth, in other words, would have to struggle 
with a serious obstacle to experiencing his or her own dignity.
Now we shall address the question whether there is a definable group which is treated 
differently. Such a group can be, in our case, defined simply as children who were initially unwanted 
by their parents. There is not identifiable a different treatment that would directly discriminate 
these children. However, the court decision awarding the damages would represent a public affir-
mation that these children represent a recoverable harm to their parents, which would in effect 
constitute an obstacle for them to fully enjoy their right to dignity. Therefore, there would be cons-
tituted an indirect discrimination on the “suspect” grounds of birth, which can be justified only by 
very weighty reasons (Cf. Sommerfeld, 2003). Even though the immaterial harm and maintenance 
costs may prove very burdensome for some parents, the courts should (in accordance with Article 3 
(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child) consider very thoroughly the interests of the child 
which would probably outweigh the needs of the parents.
30  Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall 
have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and. as far as possible, the right to know and be cared 
for by his or her parents. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, 
the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”
31  Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to 
preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without unlawful inter-
ference. Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States Parties shall provide 
appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her identity.”
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b) Negative discrimination caused by dismissal of damages
Unwanted children indeed are, in certain sense, a vulnerable group. Setting aside possi-
ble psychological issues resulting from knowing about their “unwantedness” (which could be, as 
argued above, seriously strengthened by awarding damages in wrongful birth cases), unwanted 
children are more likely to live in lower-income families (Cf. Jones, Darroch, & Henshaw, 2002) 
or just families with many children and little resources left (Cf. Goold, & Herring, 2014, p. 101). 
Children with severe disabilities need sometimes very high maintenance costs which may get the 
family in serious financial troubles.
According to Article 27 (1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, every child has 
the right “. . . to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and 
social development.”
It can be argued that if the financial problems of the family were solved or at least al-
leviated, the relationship between the parents and the child could actually be improved (Goold, & 
Herring, 2014, p. 101).
The argument may go further and claim that awarding compensations for wrongful birth 
could in fact reduce the number of abortions. It is not very difficult to imagine a pregnant woman 
who conceived after sterilization and who desperately seeks some way to be able to feed her child. 
Knowing that there is a possibility of wrongful birth claim, she may decide not to abort the baby.32 
The question is whether this effect would outweigh possible pressure on physicians to recommend 
abortions in fear of litigations.
But regardless the effects on abortion rates, the claim can be made that dismissal of da-
mages would constitute the indirect discrimination of the first subtype, i.e. the fail to offer a special 
treatment to the vulnerable group which needs it. It is in fact the question whether unwanted 
children have the right to positive discrimination.
In order to explain this, we would first define the positive discrimination as giving advan-
tage to a certain vulnerable group in order to compensate its vulnerability.33 The different treatment 
in this case consists of the fact that that the child’s family is provided with a significant contri-
bution to their financial situation while other families with the same number of children with 
the same health conditions and with similar socioeconomic position can expect no such help. The 
only reason for the difference in treatment is the fact that some children are unwanted and their 
parents publicly claim it.34
32  “(Compensation) may in some cases be an encouragement and help to bring up an unplanned child” (Emeh, 1985, p. 1021, 
per Walker.)
33  Cambridge dictionary (n.d.) defines positive discrimination as the act of giving advantage to those groups in society that 
are often treated unfairly because of their race, sex, etc.” However, this definition can be broadened to encompass also 
those groups which are not discriminated against intentionally, just like paraplegics or unwanted children.
34  It could be argued that the child has a right to be born to a prepared family and award of damages in its effects compensate 
the fact that unwanted children are deprived of this right. It is, however, questionable whether this right should be accepted, 
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However, the term positive discrimination obviously presumes that the different treat-
ment is rather beneficial than harming. It is necessary to realize the obvious fact that compensation, 
no matter how beneficial, is not awarded to all unwanted children born to struggling families. As 
Hensel (2005) accurately puts it,  
. . . assistance is provided only to those willing to openly disavow their self-worth 
and dignity. . . . No matter how compelling the need, or how gross the negligence 
involved, no assistance will be extended to the family who would have chosen 
to embrace or simply accept the impaired child prior to his birth. . . . Whatever 
the ultimate result of litigation, those involved are likely to feel abused and dimi-
nished rather than empowered and vindicated. (pp. 171-172).
This seems to be too high a price, especially for the child who is not capable of deciding 
whether to pay it. 
The objection can be made that some children would be willing to pay the price when 
they grow up enough to realize the pros and cons. A partial counter-argument can highlight the fact 
that the child would probably have not wanted it had it not been for a serious financial distress, 
which should be fixed by the social security system.35 If this system fails, it calls for healing the 
system, not unsystematic symptoms. However, we can still assume that the discrimination consti-
tuted by award of damages could be positive.
Positive discrimination can only be a person’s right when the situation not only permits, 
but requires it (Cf. Alexy, 2002, p. 274). The social security system argument can be made to dispro-
ve such requirement. However, even the permissibility of this kind of positive discrimination can 
be questioned.
The financial situation of the family is not caused by the fact that the child was unwa-
nted. It is undoubtedly true that many people want to avoid the birth of a child because of their 
unfavourable financial situation, and from the perspective of these parents, the unwanted child in-
deed means a financial burden. On the other hand, from the perspective of the child the situation is 
different. This particular child lives with the family with certain socioeconomic status and possibili-
ties regardless of whether he or she was wanted or not. The alternative for the parents is not having 
this child, but the alternative for this child is non-existence (or life with adoptive family). The fact 
the child was not wanted does not invade into the child’s proprietary rights, but rather into her or 
his immaterial rights. However, the question may arise why we should consider the psychological 
distress of the child caused by the fact he or she was not wanted as a justification of compensation 
while we let other children with different but equally serious issues without noticing. Our previous 
if only theoretically. More importantly, unwanted children whose parents did not sue for damages were also born into un-
prepared (but perhaps more accepting) families.
35  Article 27 (3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “assures to assist parents and others responsible for the child 
to implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with 
regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.” 
Article 27 (4) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: “parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the 
child, both within the State Party and from abroad.” 
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claim that the court should not contribute to the mental suffering of the unwanted child does not 
imply that different causes of mental suffering are any less severe.
We can conclude that positive discrimination constituted by awarding damages in wron-
gful birth cases is doubtfully permissible and not required. Therefore, it cannot be a right of any 
person, hence the dismissal of damages cannot constitute negative discrimination.
Conclusion
From the strictly positivist perspective, wrongful birth claims are usually not very difficult 
cases. When the breach of a contractual duty of the medical service provider, the harm and the causal 
nexus are proven, the plaintiff ’s claim should usually be granted. However, the ethical concerns are 
so many and so serious that the claims are often dismissed with a reference to good morals or public 
order. We examined the research question whether there is also the third possible objection to the 
claims, that is discriminative effects of the court decision to award damages on the child concerned.
We came to the conclusion that dignity of the child can be seriously harmed by award of 
damages. Since it is not logically coherent to claim that damages are awarded only for the negative 
consequences of having a child while the child is rather beneficial to the parents, it is inevitable to 
conclude that the court, by awarding damages, affirms with all its authority given by the state that 
the child is a burden and harm to her or his family. Psychological consequences of such a decision 
for the child can be very serious.
We defined the vulnerable group of unwanted children and showed that award of dama-
ges – in its meaning of official and public declaration of the child’s harming effects on the family – 
means a different treatment in respect to other children whose benefits for the family are generally 
recognized and praised by the society. This represents a negative discrimination on the grounds of 
birth, which needs particularly weighty reasons to be justified. 
In most cases, such reasons cannot be identified. However, the harm imposed by discrimi-
nation in wrongful birth cases consists mainly of the destructive psychological effects on the child. 
In cases of children with very severe mental disabilities who are not capable of understanding the 
meaning of wrongful birth litigation, the harm perceived by the child is none. At the same time, 
these children’s special needs are usually especially burdensome on the family. Even though the fi-
nancial struggles of these families are not more serious than problems of more accepting parents of 
equally disabled children and should be primarily addressed by the social security system, this fact 
– in connection with the lack of harm done to the child – might represent “very weighty reasons” 
justifying the different treatment.36
36  Here it is appropriate to recall a very similar approach taken by Austrian Supreme Court.
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We therefore further examined the question whether the dismissal of damages could not 
constitute a negative discrimination against the child. This would mean that the situation of unwa-
nted children require a special treatment, i.e. positive discrimination. However, we concluded that 
the harm done to the child by awarding damages would probably overweigh any benefits of finan-
cial support, and, even more importantly, the financial problems of the families with both wanted 
and unwanted children should be equally addressed by the social security system. These cases never-
theless deserve special consideration and there might arguably be circumstances in which individual 
assessment of good morals allows for award of damages by way of an exception from general norm.
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